The CAMA Ruling and Its Implications for NGO Governance and Regulatory Oversight in Nigeria

Introduction

The regulatory framework governing Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), religious institutions, charitable foundations and other non-profit associations in Nigeria operates at the intersection of statutory oversight and constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association. Although the Corporate Affairs Commission is vested with statutory responsibility for the registration and regulation of incorporated trustees, the permissible scope of its supervisory authority, particularly in relation to the internal governance and administration of voluntary associations, has remained a subject of significant constitutional and legal scrutiny.

The Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 introduced a regulatory framework that substantially broadened the Commission's interventionist powers over incorporated trustees. Notably, Sections 839, 842-848 and 851 conferred powers touching upon the suspension of trustees, the administration of incorporated associations and the exercise of regulatory control over their affairs. These provisions generated considerable controversy, particularly concerning the extent to which statutory regulation could encroach upon the autonomy of voluntary associations and the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

The constitutional validity of these provisions was subsequently considered in Emmanuel Ekpenyong v. National Assembly & Ors., culminating in a decision of the Federal High Court declaring the impugned provisions unconstitutional. The ensuing appeal by the CAC presented an opportunity for appellate judicial scrutiny of the statutory framework and the constitutional boundaries of the Commission's regulatory mandate. On 17 September 2026, the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division, delivered a unanimous judgment substantially affirming the decision of the lower court.

The judgment carries significant implications for the governance of incorporated trustees in Nigeria. Beyond its immediate effect on the exercise of the CAC's statutory powers, the decision engages fundamental questions concerning the limits of administrative authority, the constitutional protection of associational autonomy and the extent to which regulatory intervention may lawfully extend into the internal affairs of non-profit institutions.

The Regulatory Framework Under CAMA 2020

The incorporation of trustees under Part F of CAMA 2020 provides a legal framework through which associations established for religious, charitable, educational, social and other non-profit purposes acquire corporate personality. Such incorporation facilitates the holding of property, the continuity of institutional operations and the capacity to undertake legal transactions in the name of the association. The CAC's regulatory mandate is consequently neither incidental nor without legal foundation. The Commission is entrusted with ensuring compliance with the statutory

requirements applicable to incorporated trustees, maintaining relevant registration records and exercising such supervisory functions.

The controversy surrounding CAMA 2020, however, arose from the extent of the powers conferred upon the Commission. The provisions challenged in Ekpenyong contemplated regulatory interventions extending beyond registration and statutory compliance into matters affecting the leadership, and administration of incorporated associations.

Section 839, in particular, empowered the CAC, in specified circumstances, to suspend trustees and appoint interim managers to administer an association's affairs. The statutory framework also contemplated consequential interventions affecting the management of institutional assets and the continued administration of the association. The concern was not merely that the Commission possessed regulatory powers. It was that the exercise of those powers could substantially displace the governing structures established by an association's constitution and permit an administrative authority to assume control over institutions whose existence and activities were protected by the Constitution.

The Constitutional Challenge in Emmanuel Ekpenyong v. National Assembly & Ors.

The dispute originated from an action instituted by Emmanuel Ekpenyong, a constitutional lawyer, against the National Assembly, the CAC and the Attorney-General of the Federation.

In Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1076/2020, the claimant challenged Sections 839, 842, 843, 844, 845,

846, 847, 848 and 851 of CAMA 2020, contending that the provisions infringed fundamental rights guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The challenge was founded principally upon the constitutional guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience and religion under Section 38, and freedom of association and peaceful assembly under Section

40. The claimant also raised questions concerning the constitutional allocation of judicial powers and the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The court held that the powers conferred upon the CAC under Sections 839-848 were excessive and constituted an infringement of the claimant's constitutionally protected rights. The court accordingly declared the challenged provisions, including Section 851, unconstitutional, null and void.

Dissatisfied with the decision, the CAC appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal placed before the appellate court the validity of the challenged regulatory powers, the claimant's standing to institute the action and the constitutional limits of the Commission's authority over incorporated trustees. The Court of Appeal's decision substantially upheld the lower court's findings, while making an important qualification concerning Section 851.

Freedom of Association and the Autonomy of Incorporated Trustees

The constitutional significance of the judgment lies principally in its recognition that the statutory incorporation of an association does not extinguish the fundamental rights upon which its existence is founded.

Section 40 of the Constitution guarantees the right of every person to assemble freely and associate with other persons, including the right to form or belong to associations for the

protection of their interests. In the context of incorporated trustees, this guarantee encompasses the institutional arrangements through which individuals organise, govern and pursue the lawful objectives of their associations.

Similarly, Section 38 protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to manifest and practise religious beliefs. For religious institutions, the selection of leadership, administration of affairs and implementation of institutional doctrines are matters closely connected with the exercise of these constitutional freedoms.

The Court of Appeal recognised the constitutional significance of this institutional autonomy. In affirming the lower court's decision, the appellate court held that voluntary associations are generally entitled to manage their internal affairs, subject to their governing constitutions and the applicable law. An organisation's constitution ordinarily establishes the framework for the appointment and removal of trustees, the exercise of decision-making powers and the administration of its affairs. Interference with these arrangements may consequently affect not only the association as a legal entity but also the constitutional rights of its members.

Implications for NGOs, Religious Institutions and Other Incorporated Trustees

The judgment has significant implications for the governance of incorporated trustees in Nigeria.

First, it reinforces the legal distinction between regulatory supervision and institutional control. The CAC's statutory responsibilities remain relevant to the registration, administration and compliance obligations of incorporated trustees. However, the Commission's exercise of regulatory authority is subject to constitutional limitations, particularly where the intervention affects the internal governance of associations.

The judgment also reinforces the significance of an association's governing constitution. The internal arrangements of incorporated trustees remain central to the administration of their affairs, subject to applicable law. Trustees and members are therefore required to operate within the governance framework established by their respective constitutions, rather than treating institutional autonomy as an exemption from legal accountability.

In addition, the decision provides a significant constitutional reference point for future disputes involving administrative intervention in the affairs of non-profit institutions. Where a regulatory measure materially affects the exercise of fundamental rights, its validity must be assessed against the applicable constitutional guarantees and the limitations prescribed by the Constitution.

Finally, the judgment underscores the importance of distinguishing between the lawful exercise of administrative functions and the assumption of powers constitutionally reserved for the judiciary. Regulatory authorities remain subject to judicial oversight, particularly where their actions affect legal rights and obligations.

The practical consequence is the reinforcement of a constitutional framework within which accountability is pursued without impermissible interference with protected freedoms.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal's decision in Emmanuel Ekpenyong v. National Assembly & Ors. represents a significant judicial intervention in the regulation of incorporated trustees under CAMA 2020. By affirming the unconstitutionality of Sections 839 and 842-848, the appellate court has placed substantive limits on the extent to which the CAC may exercise regulatory powers capable of displacing the internal governance structures of voluntary associations.

The court's treatment of Section 851 further clarifies the constitutional distinction between administrative regulation and judicial authority. While the CAC retains its legitimate administrative and regulatory functions, the exercise of those functions remains subject to the Constitution and the supervisory jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The broader significance of the judgment lies in its reaffirmation of constitutional supremacy in the regulation of non-profit institutions. Statutory incorporation does not extinguish the fundamental freedoms of the individuals and associations concerned, nor does the existence of a regulatory mandate confer unrestricted authority upon the agency exercising it.